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Intellectual Property

by Laurence P. Colton*
Kerri Hochgesang
Todd Williams"r
and Dana T. Hustins""
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys caselaw developments in the area of intellectual
property relevant to the Eleventh Circuit during the 2009 calendar
year.' Intellectual property law comprises several discrete yet overlapping areas of law. The four primary areas of intellectual property law
are patent law, trademark law (including areas such as domain name2
law and "cybersquatting"), copyright law, and trade secret law.
Because patent law and copyright law are provided for in the United
States Constitution,3 cases in these areas are litigated exclusively in
*

Partner in the law firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Tufts

University (B.S.Ch.E., 1982); Emory University (J.D., 1987). Member, State Bar of
Georgia. Registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
** Associate in the law firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
Indiana State University (B.A., 1999); Franklin Pierce Law Center (J.D., M.I.P., 2002).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the law firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Florida (B.A., 2002); Harvard Law School (J.D., 2005). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
**** Associate in the law firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
Georgia Institute of Technology (B.S., 1996); Emory University (J.D., 2007). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit intellectual property law during the prior survey
period, see Laurence P. Colton, Todd Williams & Dana T. Hustins, Intellectual Property,
2008 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1255 (2009).
2. Some secondary areas that will not be surveyed in this Article include trade dress
and know-how. Further, as most precedential cases in this area have been decided under
federal law, this Article will not include cases from the state courts.
3. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution provides that "[tihe
Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
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federal courts. Trademark law and trade secret law have both federal4
and state aspects, and the cases in these areas are based on federal or
state law. However, the more interesting cases often are litigated in the
federal courts.
The Authors have not attempted to include all cases that touch upon
intellectual property but instead have selected decisions that are of more
significance or interest or that may indicate a particular direction in the
areas of law. While the cited cases often have multiple issues, the
Authors have included only the more relevant or interesting intellectual
property issues. As such, this Article will focus on developments selected
from the federal courts that are controlling on federal courts in the
Eleventh Circuit and will also discuss appropriate and interesting state
law cases.
II.

PATENT

Following its recent yearly tradition of shaking up United States
patent law, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which hears all patent-related appeals, has reinterpreted the penalty
that may be imposed against a patent owner for falsely marking articles
as patented. As a result of this reinterpretation, greater total fines may
potentially be imposed against an entity that falsely marks an article as
patented. In Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co.,' the Federal Circuit
issued a potentially far-reaching holding regarding the penalty provision
of 35 U.S.C. § 292,6 the patent false-marking statute.' The decision in
Forest Group turned on the definition of the word offense in 35 U.S.C.
§ 292(a), which provides, "Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in
advertising in connection with any unpatented article, the word 'patent'
or any word or number importing that the same is patented for the
purpose of deceiving the public... Isihall be fined not more than $500
for every such offense."'
The issue in Forest Group was whether every decision to falsely mark
an article or group of articles, which can include a single production run

Writings and Discoveries" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Authors and Writings refer to
copyright, and Inventors and Discoveries refer to patent.
4. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution is the Commerce
Clause, which forms the constitutional basis for federal trademark and unfair competition
legislation, and provides that "Itihe Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006).
7. See Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1301.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a); see Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1301.
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of a million articles, constituted an "offense" (as the district court had
held), or whether every article that had been falsely marked constituted
a separate "offense."9 The Federal Circuit chose the latter approach for
multiple reasons. First, the court noted that as a matter of statutory
interpretation, 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) "prohibits false marking of 'any
unpatented article,' and it imposes a fine for 'every such offense. ' ""
Second, the court noted that the policy considerations that informed the
false-marking statute-in particular, the consideration that "[aicts of
false marking deter innovation and stifle competition in the marketplace"-also supported an interpretation of "offense" on a per-article
basis. 1 As the court stated, "These injuries occur each time an article
is falsely marked. The more articles that are falsely marked the greater
the chance that competitors will see the falsely marked article and be
deterred from competing." 12 Finally, the court determined that a perdecision interpretation of "offense" would render the statute ineffective
it would provide insufficient deterrence against false markbecause
13
ing.
The expansive "per-article" interpretation of the term offense adopted
by the court in Forest Group is significant because 35 U.S.C. § 292, as
a qui tam statute, allows private citizens to bring suit to enforce the
government's interest in preventing patent false marking.' 4 Thus, as
the Federal Circuit acknowledged, its interpretation could give rise to a
new "cottage industry" of false-marking litigation brought by "marking
trolls" who have not suffered any direct harm but who stand to collect
potentially massive damage awards based on the number of articles a
company places into commerce with a false marking on them."
While the potential for this type of litigation is a real concern, the
Federal Circuit may soon have the opportunity to limit the reach of its
Forest Group decision. Because Forest Group involved a company that
falsely marked its product with patents that never covered the products
at all,' 6 it is not yet clear whether the Federal Circuit will apply the
same expansive interpretation of "offense" to cases in which a company
falsely marks a product with a patent that formerly covered the product

9. Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1300-01.
10. Id. at 1301 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 292 (a)).
11. Id. at 1302.
12. Id. at 1303.
13. Id. at 1304.
14. Section 292(b) states, "Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event one-half
shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of the United States." 35 U.S.C.
§ 292(b).
15. Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1303.
16. Id. at 1299.
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but has since expired. Of course, it makes little sense from a statutory
construction standpoint to have one definition of offense for falsely
marking a product with expired patents and another for falsely marking
a product with patents that never covered the product at all. But from
a policy standpoint, the distinction is sound because the deterrence
rationale noted in Forest Group may apply less when expired patents
have been falsely marked, and the sin is not necessarily one of commission but could rather be one of omission (failing to pull a product's
packaging from the market as soon as one of the patents it is marked
with expires). This is especially true given that 35 U.S.C. § 287(a)'
requires a product to be marked for the patentee to recover damages
(unless the patentee can prove that the infringer had notice of the
patent). ' If products are covered by more than one patent, owners who
are caught between the Scylla of 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) and Charybdis of 35
U.S.C. § 292(a) will have to constantly monitor and change out their
inventory as various patents expire.
This issue may soon be resolved in the pending appeal of Pequignot v.
Solo Cup Co.'9 In Solo Cup, a company marked a product with two
patents that formerly covered the product but had since expired.2"
Before the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Forest Group, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Solo Cup
held that in expiration cases the presumption of intent to deceive is
weaker than when a company falsely marks a product with patents that
never covered the products at all because both the possibility of actual
deceit and the benefit to the false marker are diminished." Further,
the district court interpreted the term offense under 35 U.S.C. § 292 on

17. 35 U.S.C. 287 (2006).
18. Id. Section 287 states, in relevant part,
Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United
States any patented article for or under them, or importing any patented article
into the United States, may give notice to the public that the same is patented,
either by fixing thereon the word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", together with
the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article, this can not
be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them is
contained, a label containing a like notice. In the event of failure so to mark, no
damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except
on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to
infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.
Id.
19. 646 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Va. 2009).
20. Id. at 792.
21. Id. at 797-98.
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a per-decision, not a per-article, basis.22 Thus, it remains to be seen
how the Federal Circuit will reconcile its interpretation of offense in
Forest Group with the facts of Solo Cup in the pending appeal.23
In Abbott Laboratoriesv. Sandoz, Inc.,24 the Federal Circuit resolved
a split in its own jurisprudence regarding the test for infringement of
product-by-process claims.25 As the name suggests, a "product-byprocess" claim is a claim in a patent directed toward the manner of
making or manufacturing a particular product.26 Such claims have
sometimes been employed when it is difficult to describe the particular
structure or composition of a new product, such as a novel pharmaceutical compound.27
At issue in the case was Abbott's patent covering its Omnicef
antibiotic drug. Sandoz and other generic drug manufacturers had filed
Abbreviated New Drug Applications with the United States Food and
Drug Administration, seeking approval to manufacture generic versions
of Omnicef. During litigation in the lower courts, Abbott asserted its
product-by-process claims against the generic manufacturers despite the
fact that the manufacturers used different processes to make their
generic versions of the drug."
On appeal, an en banc Federal Circuit elected to resolve a split created
in the early 1990s by two of its panels in Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc. 29 and Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v.
Faytex Corp.3 ° The panel in Scripps held that a product-by-process
claim was directed toward the product-not the process-and that a
manufacturer was liable for infringement if it manufactured a product
(by whatever method) that was equivalent to the product claimed in the
patent.3' By contrast, the panel in Atlantic Thermoplastics held that
process limitations were key limitations of any product-by-process claim
and that a manufacturer was only liable if it manufactured the product

22. Id. at 801.
23. In the short time since the decision in Forest Group, we have seen the "cottage
industry" of qui tam lawsuits arise with a vengeance. The United States Congress has also
amended the currently pending patent reform bill to include a provision stating that an
entity can only file a false-marking lawsuit if that entity has actually been harmed by the
false marking. H.R. 4954, 111th Cong. (2009).
24. 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010).
25. Id. at 1293.
26. See id. at 1294.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 1285-87.
29. 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
30. 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
31. 927 F.2d at 1583.
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using the same process as claimed in the patent. 2 In siding with the
panel in Atlantic Thermoplastics,the en banc Federal Circuit in Sandoz
cited the patent statute and noted that a patentee was required to
disclose the particular details of the invention in exchange for the
monopoly grant of a patent:
In sum, it is both unnecessary and logically unsound to create a rule
that the process limitations of a product-by-process claim should not be
enforced in some exceptional instance when the structure of the
claimed product is unknown and the product can be defined only by
reference to a process by which it can be made. Such a rule would
expand the protection of the patent beyond the subject matter that the
inventor has "particularly point[ed] out and distinctly claim[ed]" as his
invention .... "
Thus, for the time being, process limitations in a product-by-process
patent claim are considered key limitations on the claim, and entities
will only be liable for infringement of that claim if the entity manufactures the product using the same process as claimed in the patent.
In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 3" the Federal
Circuit applied the United States Supreme Court's 2007 MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.," standard for exercising declaratory judgment
jurisdiction in a patent infringement case. 6 In MedImmune the
Supreme Court overruled the Federal Circuit's fairly narrow test for
determining whether a party could bring suit against a patent owner
seeking to invalidate the patent. 7 As announced in MedImmune, the
proper test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction is "'whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.'"3 8
The case of Revolution Eyewear involved a patent dispute between two
rival manufacturers of eyeglasses-Revolution Eyewear and Aspex
Shortly after obtaining a patent entitled "Auxiliary
Eyewear.3 9

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

970 F.2d at 846-47.
566 F.3d at 1294-95 (alterations in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)).
556 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
549 U.S. 118 (2007).
Revolution Eyewear, 556 F.3d at 1298.
See id. at 1297.
549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273

(1941)).
39. Revolution Eyewear, 556 F.3d at 1295.
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Eyewear Attachment Methods and Apparatus" 0 in 2003, Revolution
brought suit against Aspex, alleging that one of Aspex's products
infringed the patent. In turn, Aspex filed counterclaims seeking a
judgment of invalidity, non-infringement, or unenforceability. During
the lengthy pretrial process, Aspex removed the allegedly infringing
product from the market. Finally, just before trial was set to begin in
2007, Revolution unilaterally filed with the United States District Court
for the Central District of California a covenant not to sue Aspex based
on any past or present (as of the filing date) infringement by Aspex.
Upon motion by Revolution, the court dismissed the case, including
Aspex's counterclaims, noting that Revolution's covenant not to sue
removed the controversy between the parties.4 1
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Aspex maintained that there was
still a substantial controversy between the parties such that declaratory
judgment jurisdiction over Aspex's counterclaims was appropriate.
Specifically, Aspex argued that it wished to reintroduce the same
allegedly infringing product to the marketplace and that Revolution's
covenant not to sue would not preclude Revolution from filing another
lawsuit against Aspex based on Aspex's alleged future infringement.42
The Federal Circuit, in reversing the lower court, noted that Aspex's
future plans to reintroduce the allegedly infringing product to the
marketplace were not speculative.4" "Indeed," the Court noted, "it
appears that Aspex already has in storage a quantity of the product that
it sold before and wishes to sell again. In turn, Revolution states that
it will return to court if Aspex reenters this market with these products."4 4 Thus, the court distinguished its decision in Revolution
Eyewear from prior cases in which the alleged infringer had merely
vague plans to enter the market or was protected from future infringement actions based on a covenant not to sue.45
In ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.,46 the Federal
Circuit struck down some of the patentee's claims for failing to comply

40. U.S. Patent No. 6,550,913 (filed Nov. 2, 1998) (issued Apr. 22, 2003).
41. Revolution Eyewear, 556 F.3d at 1295-96.
42. Id. at 1299.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1298 (citing Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1348-49
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that future plans of alleged infringer were too speculative to
support declaratory judgment jurisdiction); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging
Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that a covenant not to sue covered
future sales of the allegedly infringing product)).
46. 558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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with the "written description" requirement of the patent statute.47
Under this "written description" requirement, a patent applicant must
describe the invention in sufficient detail so that one skilled in the art
can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as
of the filing date sought.48 In exchange for the limited monopoly of a
patent grant, the United States Patent Laws require that the applicant
clearly disclose the invention.49
ICU Medical, Inc. (ICU) owned a patent directed toward valves for use
in intravenous medical devices (IVs). When ICU originally filed its
patent application, it only disclosed embodiments of the valves that
contained a "spike" for use in piercing a particular seal on the IV
device.5" ICU's original claims in the patent application similarly
contained a spike in each claim. During prosecution of the patent
application, however, ICU added claims that did not recite a spike.
After its patent issued with such "spikeless" claims, ICU brought suit
against Alaris Medical Systems, Inc., alleging infringement of the
spikeless claims. 1
In striking down ICU's spikeless claims, the court discounted ICU's
arguments that the embodiments disclosed in the written specification
supported "spike-optional" claims-that is, claims for which a spike may
or may not be present. 2 Rather, the court noted, ICU's spikeless
claims were broader than the invention disclosed in the patent, and
"[biased on this disclosure, a person of skill in the art would not
understand the inventor of the. . . patent[] to have invented a spikeless
medical valve."5 3 The court further dismissed ICU's argument that it
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to
develop a spikeless valve based on the "preslit" embodiment disclosed in
the patent specification: the court stated,
It is not enough that it would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill that a preslit trampoline seal could be used without a

47. Id. at 1378; 35 U.S.C. § 112. Section § 112 states,
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

35 U.S.C. § 112.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1377.
Id.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
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spike... [Rather,] "an applicant complies with the written description
requirement by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious. " '
In the case of Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. v. Rexam Beverage
Can Co.,5 the Federal Circuit applied the patent marking statute, 35
U.S.C. § 287(a)."5 This statute requires a patentee to mark a product
with the patent number as a precondition to obtaining damages in an
infringement suit. 7
In effect, the statute is designed to provide
constructive notice to the public that a product is patented."
Rexam Beverage Can Co. owned a patent directed to a process and
apparatus for reducing the diameter of the top of a beverage can before
sealing the can with a cap.59 The process, known as "smooth die
necking," creates a small indentation or lip (neck) near the top of the
can.6 ' Rexam licensed a third-party manufacturer to make and sell
necking machines in accordance with the patent but required any endpurchaser to pay a license fee directly to Rexam if the end-purchaser
used the smooth die necking feature of the machines. The machines
were also capable of performing an older, noninfringing necking
operation. Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. purchased several necking
machines from the manufacturer, none of which was marked with
Rexam's patent number. Rexam alleged that Crown then used the
machines-including the patented smooth die necking feature-to
manufacture over seventeen billion cans per year for several years
without paying any licensing fees to Rexam. 6 1
During litigation between the two parties, Crown cited the patent
marking statute and argued that Crown was not liable to Rexam for
damages because the machines were not marked with Rexam's patent
6 2
number.
Specifically, Crown cited the case of American Medical
Systems, Inc. v. Medical Engineering Corp.,3 in which the court stated,

54. Id. at 1378-79 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d
1559, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
55. 559 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
56. See id. at 1310, 1316.
57. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). Alternatively, a patentee can recover damages if the infringer
has actual notice that the product is patented. Id. For the text of § 287(a), see supra note
18.
58. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). This statue is to be distinguished from the "false marking"
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 292, mentioned previously.
59. Crown Packaging, 559 F.3d at 1316.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1310, 1316.
63. 6 F.3d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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Where the patent contains both apparatus and method claims,... to
the extent that there is a tangible item to mark by which notice of the
asserted method claims can be given, a party is obliged to do so if it
intends to avail itself of the constructive notice provisions of section
287(a). 64
Unlike in that case, however, the Federal Circuit noted that the patentee
(Rexam) in Crown Packaging,Inc. had only asserted method claims and
not apparatus claims.6 5 In Hanson v.Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc.,"
the court held that 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) does not apply when a patentee
asserts only a method claim, even though the patent included both a
method and an apparatus claim. 7 In Crown Packaging, the court
relied on Hanson in holding that § 287(a) did not apply to Rexam's claim
for infringement against Crown.6 8
In Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.,' the Federal
Circuit applied the Supreme Court's landmark 2007 decision in KSR
InternationalCo. v.Teleflex Inc.7 0 to uphold the district court's finding
that the patentee's claims were obvious to a person of ordinary skill in
the art and thus invalid.7 1 In KSR the Supreme Court overturned prior
Federal Circuit precedent in holding that patent examiners and patent
litigants could rely on "common sense" or "obvious to try" arguments
when seeking to invalidate patent claims. 2
Perfect Web filed suit against InfoUSA, alleging infringement of
Perfect Web's patent for managing bulk e-mail distribution to a group
of targeted customers.73 Claim one of Perfect Web's patent read as
follows:
1. A method for managing bulk e-mail distribution comprising the
steps:

64. Crown Packaging, 559 F.3d at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538-39).
65. Id. at 1316.
66. 718 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 1082-83.
68. 559 F.3d at 1316-17.
69. 587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
70. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). Previous years' iterations of this Article discuss KSR as it
wound its way through the federal court system. See Laurence P. Colton, Todd Williams
& Dana T. Hustins, Intellectual Property,2008 Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 60 MERCER L. REV.
1255, 1266-67 (2009); Laurence P. Colton, Nigamnarayan Acharya, Todd Williams & Dana
T. Hustins, Intellectual Property,2007 Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 59 MERCER L. REV. 1225,
1229-30 (2008).
71. Perfect Web, 587 F.3d at 1333.
72. See 550 U.S. at 421-22.
73. Perfect Web, 587 F.3d at 1326.
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(A) matching a target recipient profile with a group of target recipients;
(B) transmitting a set of bulk e-mails to said target recipients in said
matched group;
(C) calculating a quantity of e-mails in said set of bulk e-mails which
have been successfully received by said target recipients; and,
(D) if said calculated quantity does not exceed a prescribed minimum
quantity of successfully received e-mails, repeating steps (A)-(C) until
said calculated quantity exceeds said prescribed minimum quantity.74
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
found that steps (A) through (C) were explicitly taught by the prior
art.75
Examining the fourth step, the district court found that it
involved simple repetition of the first three steps and was "merely the
logical result of common sense application of the maxim 'try, try
again.'" 7" Accordingly, pursuant to the decisions in KSR, the district
court held that in view of the prior art, claim one was obvious to a
person of ordinary skill in the art and was thus invalid."
On appeal, Perfect Web argued that the district court failed to
properly support its "common sense" finding with particular evidence or
expert opinion.7" The Federal Circuit acknowledged that findings ' of
79
obviousness "'cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements. "'
Nevertheless, the court wrote, the Supreme Court's precedential decision
in KSR "instructed that factfinders may use common sense in addition
The court added that "while an analysis of
to record evidence." 0
obviousness always depends on evidence that supports the required
Graham factual findings, it also may include recourse to logic, judgment,
and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not
necessarily require explication in any [prior art] reference or expert
opinion."81 Because the district court made proper factual findings and
adequately explained its application of the "common sense" test
articulated in KSR, the district court's ruling was affirmed.82

74. U.S. Patent No. 6,631,400 (filed Apr. 13, 2000) (issued Oct. 7, 2003).
75. Perfect Web, 587 F.3d at 1327.
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA,
Inc., No. 07-80286-CIV, 2008 WL 6153736, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2008)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1327-28.
79. Id. at 1330 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
80. Id. at 1329.
81. Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
82. Id. at 1330.
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In Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2LearnInc.,s the Federal Circuit upheld
a finding that a patentee's "means-plus-function" claims were invalid for
indefiniteness.' Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, an inventor may draft
claims in "means-plus-function" form, wherein the claim language
merely recites a "means" for performing a specific function without
specifically describing the structure of the claimed means.'
The
corresponding structure, however, must be disclosed in the text of the
patent specification so that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
know how to build the claimed means based on the disclosure. 6
Blackboard, Inc. owned a patent entitled "Internet-Based Education
Support System and Methods."87 Several claims in the patent were
written in means-plus-function format' and were directed to a system
for providing online educational courses. 9 In particular, one clause in
an independent claim recited a "means for assigning a level of access to
During litigation,
and control of each data file [in the system]."'
Blackboard argued that a paragraph in the specification referring to an
"access control manager" provided the corresponding structure for the
"assigning" means recited in its claim.9" The Federal Circuit, however,
disagreed with Blackboard, stating,
[Wihat the patent calls the "access control manager" is simply an
abstraction that describes the function of controlling access to course
materials, which is performed by some undefined component of the
system. The ACM is essentially a black box that performs a recited
function. But how it does so is left undisclosed.92
Therefore, the court held that Blackboard's means-plus-function claim
was indefinite because there was no corresponding structure in the text
of the specification that defined the "assigning" means.93

83. 574 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
84. Id. at 1385-86.
85. 35 U.S.C. § 112. Section 112 states,
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts
in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
Id.
86. Id.
87. U.S. Patent No. 6,988,138 (filed Jun. 30, 2000) (issued Jan. 17, 2006).
88. Blackboard, Inc., 574 F.3d at 1382.
89. Id. at 1373.
90. Id. at 1382.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1383.
93. Id. at 1385-86.
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In CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC,94 the Federal Circuit
examined a licensee's "have made" rights under a licensing agreement.9" CoreBrace owned a patent directed to a brace used in earthquake-resistant steel-framed buildings.96 Star Seismic obtained a nonexclusive license to the patent, which provided Star Seismic with the
right to "make, use, and sell" licensed products.9" The license expressly
prohibited Star Seismic from assigning, sublicensing, or otherwise
transferring its rights to a third-party but was silent on whether Star
Seismic could engage a third-party to manufacture licensed products on
its behalf. After Star Seismic began using a third-party manufacturer,
CoreBrace sued Star Seismic for breaching the license.9"
In a matter of first impression under Utah law, the Federal Circuit
looked to precedents by the California Supreme Court and the United
States Court of Claims.9 9 The Federal Circuit held that the "have
made" right to have a product manufactured by a third-party is an
inherent right of a license to "make, use, and sell" a product absent a
clear indication in the license to the contrary.'O' CoreBrace argued
that because the license at issue was a nonexclusive license rather than
an exclusive one, Star Seismic should not be allowed to have others
The court dismissed this
manufacture products on its behalf.''
argument, however, holding that the nonexclusive nature of the license
had no relevance to the inherent "have made" rights under the
license. °2
III.

COPYRIGHT

In Wilchombe v. Teevee Toons, Inc.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of what conduct
will suffice to create a nonexclusive license to use a copyrighted
work."4 The dispute in Wilchombe centered on a song first written
and recorded by the plaintiff, Redwin Wilchcombe, that was included on

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

566 F.3d 1069 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
See id. at 1070-71.
Id. at 1070.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1073.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1073-74.

103. 555 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 2009). Note that the plaintiffs name is incorrectly spelled
as Wilchombe (rather than Wilchcombe) in the case name appearing in the Federal
Reporter.

104.

See id. at 955-58.
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an album by the musical group Lil Jon & the East Side Boyz without
attribution or payment to Wilchcombe. When Wilchcombe sued for
copyright infringement, the defendants argued that Wilchcombe had
granted them an implied license to use the song on their album, and the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
agreed. 5
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that
the parties' conduct had created an implied license.10 6 In so holding,
the Eleventh Circuit first noted that an implied nonexclusive license is
created when one party creates a work at another party's request and
hands it over, intending that the other party copy and distribute it.' °7
The court next noted that in determining whether an implied license
exists, a court should look at objective factors evincing the party's intent,
such as "deposition testimony and whether the copyrighted material was
delivered 'without warning that its further use would constitute
copyright infringement.' 1 0 8 Applying these principles, the court held
that Wilchcombe had granted a nonexclusive license to Lil Jon & the
East Side Boyz to use the song in question because: (1) Wilchcombe
created the song for the album at Lil Jon's request and had it sent to Lil
Jon for final mixing and inclusion on the album; (2) Wilchcombe testified
that he understood that Lil Jon would use the song on the album; and
(3) Wilchcombe never mentioned to any of the defendants that using the
song would constitute copyright infringement."°
In Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc.,10 multiple record
companies (collectively BMG) brought an action against Launch Media,
Inc., a webcasting service with Internet radio capabilities. BMG alleged
that Launch had willfully infringed its sound recording copyrights from
1999 to 2001. Launch's webcasting service (LAUNCHcast) enabled users
to create "stations" that play songs within particular criteria selected by
the user. BMG owns the copyrights in some of these songs and had a
right to collect an individual licensing fee (as opposed to merely
collecting a compulsory or statutory licensing fee set by the Copyright
Royalty Board) for each song played through an "interactive service.""'
As the court noted, "[ain interactive service is defined as a service 'that
enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a program

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 953-55.
Id. at 956.
Id.
Id. (quoting I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Id.
578 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1290 (2010) (mem.).
Id. at 150; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(3XC) (2006).
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specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a
particular sound recording . . ., which is selected by or on behalf of the
recipient.'"112 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied cross motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment. The case was tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict in
favor of Launch." 3
BMG appealed the district court's denial of its motions for dismissal,
summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law on the ground that
"LAUNCHcast is an interactive service as a matter of law because
LAUNCHcast is designed and operated to enable members of the public
to receive transmissions of programs specially created for them."" 4
BMG further claimed that under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA)," 5 "there is no tipping point for the level of influence a user
must assert before the program becomes an interactive service-all that
matters is that the alleged copyright infringer is 'transmi[tting] . . . a
program specially created for' the user."" 6 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that the case's
conflict centered on whether the webcast was "interactive."'
In other
words, the issue was whether a user could either "(1) request-and have
played-a particular sound recording, or (2) receive a transmission of a
program 'specially created' for the user.""'
Opting for a narrow
construction of the statute," 9 the Second Circuit explained that
Congress enacted the DMCA to prevent record sales from diminishing
because of outright piracy or because of new digital media that allowed
people to listen to music without purchasing records. 2 '
With this purpose in mind, the Second Circuit examined the mechanics of LAUNCHcast.' 2 ' First, LAUNCHcast prompts users to choose
music artists and genres they enjoy and then asks them to rate those
selections. Users also select other preferences, including the option to
play songs with profane lyrics. Users are able to buy individual songs
or share their radio stations (but not individual songs) with other

112. Arista, 578 F.3d at 150 (alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
section of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). The DMCA made substantive changes to Title 17 of
the United States Code. See id.
116. Arista, 578 F.3d at 151 (alterations in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7).
117. Id. at 161.
118. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114j)(7)).
119. Id. at 164.
120. Id. at 157.
121. See id. at 157-60.
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listeners. While a song on a user's radio station is playing, the user is
able to pause, skip, or delete the song from the station by giving it a
"zero" rating. However, the user cannot restart or repeat a song that is
playing or has already played. LAUNCHcast creates the song bank by
first examining unrated songs and determining whether to eliminate
them from the pool for various reasons. This pool of unrated songs is
compared to a pool of all songs played for the user in the last thirty
days, and all songs given a zero rating, plus songs played for the user
within the last three hours, are excluded from the pool. LAUNCHcast
then adds the most popular songs from those rated by all LAUNCHcast
users and applies a series of formulas based on the user's music genre
preferences to select more potential songs-for a total of about 10,000
songs. When the songs are played on the radio station for the user, a
percentage of the songs is specifically rated by the user, another
percentage is implicitly rated, and a remaining percentage is unrated.
To select a song to play for a user, LAUNCHcast follows a series of rules
to avoid duplicate playing of songs, artists, or albums. Otherwise, the
ordering of the songs is random."'
Focusing on the lack of predictability of LAUNCHcast's song selection
system, the Second Circuit determined that a user of LAUNCHcast could
123
not "request and expect to hear a particular song on demand."
Thus, the first definition of interactive was not met. 1 24 The court then
examined whether LAUNCHcast was "specially created" for a user to
125
determine whether it fell under the second definition of interactive.
The court held that LAUNCHcast was not interactive and based its
determination on (1) the way in which LAUNCHcast functions and (2)
the purpose and history of the DMCA.1 26 The Court reasoned that
LAUNCHcast was not "specially created" for the user for the purposes
of the DMCA because its users did not have enough control over their
playlists that they would choose to listen to LAUNCHcast instead of
purchasing music. 1 27 In addition, the court explained that although a
user eliminates a song from a playlist by rating it a zero, "the ability not
to listen to a particular song is certainly not a violation of a copyright
holder's 8right to be compensated when the sound recording is
12
played."

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 157-60.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 161-64.
See id.
Id. at 164.
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In Metal Morphosis, Inc. v. Acorn Media Publishing, Inc.,' 29 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
analyzed the originality requirement for copyright protection.13 ° The
plaintiff and the defendant in Metal Morphosis both sold pendants in the
shape of a bird's nest; when the plaintiff sued for copyright infringement,
the defendant moved to dismiss,1 3 ' arguing that the plaintiff's bird'snest pendant lacked the originality needed for copyright protection to
attach. 132 In analyzing this claim, the district court first reiterated
that originality is the "indispensable, constitutional requirement for a
valid copyright." '33 The court also noted that the Copyright Act of
1976134 protects only the original expression of an idea-not the idea
itself-and that a work would be deemed original if an author independently creates
it and if it contains "'at least some minimal degree of
35
creativity.' ,
Applying these principles to the bird's-nest pendant at issue, the court
first noted that in nature, birds' nests can vary significantly: they can
be deeper, wider, or narrower; they can be neatly arranged out of twigs
and straw or take a less symmetrical form; and they may have different
numbers of eggs of various shapes and colors in them.13 Given these
possibilities, the court concluded that the plaintiff's bird's-nest pendant
contained the requisite degree of originality.'37 As the court stated,
The Plaintiff's bird's nest is wide and shallow. Twigs are incorporated
into the nest, but not smoothly throughout. Instead, they run more
like veins across the inside bowl that highlight the eggs. This layout
of the twigs may be rather obvious, but it is also somewhat unnatural.
Atop the twigs are three eggs in nest-two that are off-white and one
that is more lavender. Although the degree of inspiration is slight, it
meets the originality threshold.'
The district court thus denied the defendant's motion to dismiss in
relevant part, holding that the "slightly atypical" arrangement of the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

639 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
See id. at 1373.
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17

U.S.C.).
135. Metal Morphosis, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1373 (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); BUC Int'l Corp. v. Intl Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d
1129, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 2007)).
136. Id. at 1374.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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plaintiff's bird's nest provided the requisite "originality" for copyright
protection to attach. 39

IV. TRADEMARKS, DOMAIN NAME, CYBERSQUATTING
The protection of trademarks has always been an area of fruitful legal
decisions. Trademarks continue to function as a main introduction to a
company and its products. Over the past couple of decades, this
introduction has increasingly occurred through the Internet, thus
causing domain name, cybersquatting, and trademark law to intersect.
In In re Bose Corp.,140 the Federal Circuit reversed the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board's (TTAB) decision to cancel Bose Corporation's
trademark registration number for the trademark WAVE because Bose
had committed fraud against the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) in renewing the mark.'
Bose initially filed an opposition against the mark HEXAWAVE, which had been filed by Hexawave,
Inc. Bose alleged that the HEXAWAVE mark would likely be confused
with Bose's registered marks, including the WAVE mark. Hexawave
counterclaimed, stating that Bose's WAVE mark should be cancelled for
Bose's statements to the PTO that the mark was still being used on a
variety of goods when in fact, it was not being used on some of those
goods.' 42 Although Bose's Section 8 affidavit 4 ' of continued use and
Section 9 renewal application14 4 stated that the WAVE mark was still
used in commerce on audio tape recorders and players, the TTAB found
that Bose stopped manufacturing and selling those goods between 1996
and 1997. Further, the TTAB found that Bose's general counsel, who
had signed the affidavit and renewal, knew that those products had been
discontinued at the time he signed the renewal documents.'4 5
At the time Bose's general counsel signed the renewal documents,
however, Bose continued to repair audio tape recorders and players that
had already been sold, and some of these were still under warranty.
Although Bose's counsel testified that he believed such repairs constituted sufficient use to maintain the trademark registration for the goods,

139. Id. at 1374-75.
140. 580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
141. Id. at 1246.
142. Id. at 1242.
143. A trademark registrant must periodically file an Affidavit of Continued Use under
Section 8 of the U.S. Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2006), to keep the registration in
force.
144. A trademark registration must be periodically renewed under Section 9 of the U.S.
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (2006), to keep the registration in force.
145. In re Bose, 580 F.3d at 1242.
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the TTAB disagreed. Further, in support of its ruling that Bose's WAVE
mark should be cancelled in its entirety for fraud, the TTAB found that
the belief of Bose's general counsel concerning the repair of goods was
unreasonable and that his use statement in the renewal documents was
material. 4 6
The Federal Circuit reviewed the TTAB's decision de novo 4 7 and
held that although Bose had made a material misrepresentation to the
PTO, it lacked an intent to deceive. 14 The court reasoned that "[t]here
is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest
misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to deceive."' 49 The court held that Bose did not commit fraud when it
renewed its WAVE mark and that the TTAB erred when it cancelled the
mark in its entirety. 5 ° The court did hold, however, that the WAVE
mark needed to be restricted to reflect the fact that it was no longer in
use on audio tape recorders and players, and the court remanded the
This decision illuscase to the TTAB for appropriate correction.'
trates the need to be careful when maintaining trademark registrations,
especially when listing the goods and services that use the trademark.
In Importers Service Corp. v. GP Chemicals Equity, LLC,152 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held
that a defendant manufacturer did not infringe the trademark of its
former distributor when it sold bags of its "NovaRes" citrus-beverage
additive that contained its former distributor's name and logo.' 53 The
defendant, Georgia-Pacific Resins, Inc., terminated its distributor's
agreement for NovaRes with the plaintiff, Importers Service Corporation.
After doing so, Georgia-Pacific sent a letter to certain customers who
purchased NovaRes to notify them that its agreement with Importers
had been terminated but that NovaRes would still be available. A
representative of Georgia-Pacific also called NovaRes customers and told
them that the agreement had been terminated but that Georgia-Pacific
would still supply NovaRes. In addition, Georgia-Pacific provided
NovaRes customers with a credit application on which the customers had
to provide "ship to" and "bill to" information to Georgia-Pacific's staff.
For seven months after the agreement had been terminated, Georgia-

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.

Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1247.
652 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
Id. at 1294, 1308.
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Pacific sold bags of NovaRes that were marked with Importers' name
and logo in addition to Georgia-Pacific's own trademarks and logos.
During the relevant period, Georgia-Pacific sold eighty-one bags of
NovaRes weighing fifty pounds each at an average price of $12,781.
When shipped, the bags containing the NovaRes were stacked vertically
in cardboard boxes, and only the Georgia-Pacific logo appeared on the
outside of the boxes shipped by Georgia-Pacific.'
Based on these facts, Importers sued Georgia-Pacific, claiming that
Georgia-Pacific's continued sale of bags marked with Importers' name
and logo on the bottom constituted trademark infringement. 5 The
district court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment,
determining that there was no likelihood that the seven customers who
had received the bags of NovaRes with Importers' mark would be
confused.' 56 Likening the case to the "proverbial tree falling in a
forest," the court reasoned that because the seven affected customers
knew through either letter or personal contact that the distribution
agreement between Importers and Georgia-Pacific had been terminated,
Importers had presented no evidence that the customers were or would
become confused by the bags' labels. 5 7 Further, the court noted that
because Importers and Georgia-Pacific were not competitors, GeorgiaPacific's shipment of NovaRes did not divert sales from Importers. 158
Thus, absent any evidence of likely confusion, the court granted GeorgiaPacific's motion for summary judgment on Importers' trademark
infringement claims.159
Moving to some online issues, in Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v.
3M Co.,160 the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the requirement of "bad faith
intent to profit" needed to prevail on a cybersquatting claim under the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).6 The dispute
in Southern Grouts centered on the domain name diamondbrite.com,
which Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. (Southern Grouts) wanted to
register and use to advertise and sell swimming pool finishes, which it
marketed under the trademark "Diamond Brite."' 6 '

154. Id. at 1299.
155. Id. at 1294, 1299-1300.
156. Id. at 1308.
157. Id. at 1307.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1308.
160. 575 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006); S. Grouts, 575 F.3d at 1243.
162. S. Grouts, 575 F.3d at 1238.
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The issue was that 3M, a competitor in the swimming-pool finishing
industry, owned the registration for the diamondbrite.com domain
name. 6 3 When 3M first obtained the diamondbrite.com domain name,
it enjoyed trademark rights in "Diamond Brite" for use in connection
with "electronically controlled display panels and signs."" But by the
time that the dispute with Southern Grouts arose, those trademark
rights had lapsed.
Still, 3M continued to re-register the
diamondbrite.com domain name, even though it did not display content
on the website and did not intend to do so. Given these facts, Southern
Grouts sued 3M for unfair competition under the Lanham Act 165 and
violation of the ACPA."6 s The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of
3M,' ' and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 6 '
The crux of the Eleventh Circuit's holding was that Southern Grouts
failed to establish that 3M possessed the requisite "bad faith intent to
profit" needed for Southern Grouts to prevail on its ACPA claim. 69
First, the court noted that the "paradigmatic harm" the ACPA was
meant to address was the practice of holding domain names for ransom
with an intent to profit by selling them, and 3M had not intended to
profit by selling the domain name diamondbrite.com." 0 In fact, 3M
had done the opposite; as the court summarized, "Southern Grouts
accuse[d] 3M not of a design to sell a domain name.. . but of a refusal
to sell one." 7 ' Second, the Eleventh Circuit noted that a bad faith
intent to profit could be found when a defendant uses a domain name
with the intent to divert customers from the website of the trademark
owner.'72 But there was no evidence that 3M had done that, either:
the court determined that Southern Grouts "had not established that 3M
had any intention to profit ... by selling or advertising products on the

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2006).
166. S. Grouts, 575 F.3d at 1238.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1251.
169. Id. at 1246-47.
170. Id. at 1246 (citing Lucas Nursery & Landscaping v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 810 (6th
Cir. 2004)). This point was also made by the Eleventh Circuit in EagleHospital Physicians
v. SRG Consulting,561 F.3d 1298 (2009), in which the court defined cybersquattingas "'the
conduct of one who reserves with a network information center a domain name consisting
of the mark or name of a company for the purpose of relinquishing the right to [that]
domain name back to the legitimate owner for a price.'" Id. at 1307 (quoting 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:71 (4th ed. 2008)).
171. S. Grouts, 575 F.3d at 1247.
172. Id.
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www.diamondbrite.com website to unsuspecting customers in search of
Southern Grouts' [Diamond Brite] products."'7

3

The most that South-

ern Grouts could show was that 3M had retained control of the diamondbrite.com domain name not to display content but to prevent others from
registering it.'7

4

The court held that such conduct-whether or not it

showed bad faith--did not show a bad faith intent to profit.'17 The
court stated, "We cannot read the words 'intent to profit' out of the
statute."7 6 Hence, Southern Grouts' ACPA claim failed.'
The "bad faith intent to profit" requirement of the ACPA also played
a key role in the Eleventh Circuit's decision in St. Luke's Cataract &
Laser Institute, PA. v. Sanderson,'8 in which the court held that a
plaintiff may simultaneously recover damages for cybersquatting under
the ACPA and for infringement under the Lanham Act without running
afoul of the general prohibition on double recoveries.' 9 The court
outlined several points in support of this conclusion. First, the court
noted that "the statutory text of the ACPA explicitly states that a
cyberpiracy damages award is 'in addition to' any other civil remedies
otherwise available."'8 0 Second, the court held that damages awards
for trademark infringement and cybersquatting are not duplicative
because they serve different purposes: cybersquatting awards are aimed
at deterrence while infringement awards provide compensation.'"' In
support of this distinction, the court cited to the ACPA's "bad faith
intent to profit" requirement as evidence that damages for ACPA claims
"sanction or punish" in order to deter future violations of the ACPA,
whereas infringement damages only compensate the aggrieved mark
owner.' 2 In this regard, the court noted that the ACPA's statutory
damages provision was akin to the statutory damages provision in the
Copyright Act,1 " which has also been interpreted to deter and punish
wrongful conduct.1"

173. Id.
174. Id. at 1245.
175. Id. at 1247.
176. Id. at 1246 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)).
177. Id. at 1249.
178. 573 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 2009).
179. Id. at 1203; see, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) ("[T]he
courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.").
180. Sanderson, 573 F.3d at 1203-04 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(3)).
181. Id. at 1204.
182. Id. at 1204-05.
183. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
184. Sanderson, 573 F.3d at 1205-06.
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FiNAL NOTES

This year, 2009, continued a decade of interesting and relatively active
periods in the field of intellectual property. The courts heard and
decided cases interpreting some of the more precedent-setting cases
handed down over the previous few years, such as KSR, and decided on
other somewhat unexpected aspects of the law. Many of the decided
cases provide additional insight into the recent direction in which the
courts appear to be headed, such as a continued stricter interpretation
of the rights granted under the intellectual property laws, narrowing the
scope of patent and trademark registration, and the corollary that
intellectual property practitioners may have to be even more careful in
the drafting of patents, licenses, and contracts.

